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Abstract—Self-sovereign Identity promises to give users control
of their own data, and has the potential to foster advancements in
terms of personal data privacy. Self-sovereign concepts can also
be applied to other entities, such as datasets and devices. Systems
adopting this paradigm will be decentralised, with messages
passing between multiple actors, both human and representing
other entities, in order to issue and request credentials necessary
to meet individual and collective goals. Such systems are complex,
and build upon social and technical interactions and behaviours.
Modelling self-sovereign identity systems seeks to provide stake-
holders and software architects with tools to enable them to
communicate effectively, and lead to effective and well-regarded
system designs and implementations. This paper draws upon
research from Actor-based Modelling to guide a way forward
in modelling self-sovereign systems, and reports early success in
utilising the iStar 2.0 framework to provide a representation of
a birth registration case study.
I. INTRODUCING SELF-SOVEREIGN IDENTITY
The term Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI)[1] is used to describe
the ability of an individual to take ownership of their personal
data and to control who has access to that data, without
the need for a centralised infrastructure, or any control or
authorization being required by any third party. SSI has been
the subject of research and ambition for several years, but
has reached an inflection point in interest from industry and
the research community as a result of the availability of dis-
tributed ledger and blockchain-based technologies, combined
with an increased focus on individual’s data privacy as they
interact with web-based and social networking services[11].
The COVID-19 pandemic, and a desire by global stakeholders
and partners to develop creative technological solutions by
which to address the various epidemiological, public health,
and economic impacts of regional and local outbreaks, has
kindled additional interest in the self-sovereign concept and
its nascent implementations.
SSI is decentralised, and is built upon well-established
cryptographic techniques whereby a user holds a private and
shares a public key[9]. The private key is used to sign
documents, whilst the public key can be used by anybody
with access to it to verify that the document has indeed been
signed, and has not been tampered with. SSI uses a system
built on decentralised identifiers (DIDs) to identify parties
involved, with the DIDs resolving to documents which explain,
via machine-readable documents, how to locate the public
key needed to validate claims made about that DID, in the
same way as web addresses resolve to provide web pages.
The SSI research community has developed data models and
protocols[10] that provide mechanisms for any party identi-
fied by a DID to issue cryptographically verifiable sets of
credentials to any subject entity, also identified by a DID. In
this way, a party which believes something to be true about
another party can declare this in a standardised way using
a JSON-LD[7] formatted document, and sign this attestation
using asymmetric cryptography techniques, based on the DIDs
used being able to be resolvable to validate the assertions
made. This cryptographically signed document is known as
a Verifiable Credential (VC), and will be held by the subject
of the credential, or in the case of a child, or dataset or IoT
asset, by an authorised Holder.
At a later date, when the holder seeks to enter into a
transaction, a service provider may request proof of status
or entitlements. The Verifiable Credential document provides
a means for this proof to be provided, as the holder of the
credential can generate a Verifiable Presentation containing
assertions from the VC document. By processing the Verifiable
Presentation document, the Verifier can use the accessible
public keys to check that i) the presented proof pertains
to the subject it is being presented on behalf of, ii) the
presented proof contains assertions signed by the original
Issuer, and finally iii) that the presented documents have not
been tampered with. As such, triangles of trust[5] can be
leveraged to enable parties to issue, hold and verify credentials
without reliance on any central authority, as illustrated in
Figure1.
II. MODELLING SELF-SOVEREIGN IDENTITY SYSTEMS
To date, the focus of effort in the SSI community has
been on personal identity and data privacy for individuals[12],
however the underlying computer science techniques can be
applied to any type of entity, including digital assets such
as datasets[2], and physical devices partaking in the Internet
of Things (IoT)[3]. Systems based on the paradigm of the
self-sovereignty of human participants, data resources and
IoT devices are inherently decentralised, with attributes held
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Fig. 1. The Triangle of Trust between parties
at the edges of the ecosystem, with access to them granted
on request. These systems mix interactions with people and
machines to achieve the desired goals, and are an embodiment
of socio-technical systems. Access to data is granted at the
discretion of the holders of the data, in response to requests
from parties which require access to complete a transaction
or meet a goal. From the perspective of a verifying party
checking credentials of a holder, a request to present a proof
of credentials could be required for two reasons:
• Qualities – “Does the party that Im interacting with
have the qualities that I need in order for me to use it
to complete my task?” – for example, does a software
product that I’m evaluating have a suitable level of
certification?
• Entitlements – “Does the party that Im interacting with
hold the entitlements they need allow them to access
resources that I control?” – e.g., do they have the correct
levels of authority to enter the building?
In both cases, the Verifying party requires proof of the
credentials being held by the other party. In order to gain this
proof, the Verifier makes a request to the Holder, for a presen-
tation of the credentials. The Holder can make a decision on
whether they are comfortable to comply with the request and
provide a presentation. On receipt of the presentation of the
credentials, the Verifier can check validity, and make their own
judgement on the suitability of the credentials being presented.
The consideration of this judgement will depend on the value
of the interaction, but will typically take into account the
identity and status of the Issuer of the credentials that are
being presented, such that credentials will need to have been
issued by credible or trusted parties in order to be acceptable.
Furthermore, additional proof may be required to show that
the credential has been issued to the party presenting it[6].
As such, SSI systems can be seen to involve multiple actors,
with their own sets of both personal and organisational goals,
and with policies which need to be verified and conditionally
enacted. The system operates through interactive communica-
tion and messages between the actors, in requesting to access
resources or services, and in being asked to issue, or to provide
proofs of credentials.
Current instantiations of SSI systems are immature,
with standards going through the W3C recommendation
process[10] and commercial projects largely at the pilot or
proof of concept stage. Implementations of such systems
are complex, requiring infrastructure for cryptographic key
generation and management, secure credential storage, and
mechanisms for secure message passing between the parties,
both between agents in the cloud and mobile wallet applica-
tions held and interacted with by end-users. As such, there is
currently little practical experience and shared knowledge of
how to design and build these systems available for researchers
and engineers to draw upon, and implementation is time
consuming and reliant on skilled developer resources.
In spite of practical implementation difficulties, the mech-
anisms of operation of SSI systems are clear, and defined
by published protocols. It seems desirable, therefore, for SSI
researchers to use models to further their understanding of
the mechanics of the systems they seek to design, such that
effective implementations can be delivered once the underlying
infrastructure matures. It is hoped that providing clear and
concise documentation and models of these complex systems
will promote effective communication between domain ex-
perts, software architects and developers. The prospect of con-
verting models into simulations of SSI systems, operating in
agent-based environments, such as Hash.ai1, is an interesting
prospect. This would enable interactions between the actors
to be visualised by stakeholders, and systems to analysed and
verified and validated to ensure that policies are being correctly
expressed and implemented.
In seeking techniques for modelling SSI systems, literature
from the field of Actor Based Modelling (ABM) has offered
a promising starting point. In particular, the i* framework
developed in the PhD thesis of Yu[13] in the mid-nineties,
and developed further in recent years towards the iStar 2.0[4]
modelling language, offers many parallel constructs to those
explored in SSI systems, and provides a lens through which
techniques for modelling of SSI systems can begin to be
investigated.
In particular, iStar 2.0 provides metaphors to define the
Actors in a system, and to specify actor’s goals as well as any
tasks they can perform, along with resources they have access
to - as detailed in Figure 2. Furthermore, iStar 2.0 allows
for dependencies between actors to be specified, allowing
expression of the need for actors in the system to have reliance
on each other to perform their goal. Such dependencies take
the form of goals that actors need other actors to enact, tasks
they are dependent on other actors to perform or resources they
need other actors to provide them with. In particular, the means
of expressing a dependency on actors in the system providing
other actors with resources promises a good alignment with
parties in an SSI system issuing credentials to other parties,
and requesting proofs of credentials in order to satisfy the
goals of one party or another.
iStar 2.0 offers two main perspectives on an ecosystem
being modelled – a Strategic Dependency View which shows
1https://hash.ai
Fig. 2. Key iStar 2.0 Symbols
dependencies between the actors, and a Strategic Rationale
View which provides a means to look inside each of the
actors to see internal goals, tasks and resources. A further,
Hybrid View, provides a combination of the other two views,
with internals of some actors hidden and other’s exposed, as
appropriate to the part of the ecosystem under analysis.
III. CASE STUDY: A BIRTH REGISTRATION PROCESS
As means to gain exposure to the iStar 2.0 framework and
modelling process and to begin to gauge its applicability to
describing SSI systems, an illustrative case study is explored.
This case study comes from the NeoLinkID project, part
of the NeoInnovate Collaborative at Indiana University, and
considers a birth registration process. The scenario described
below is being studied as a hypothetical venue for the re-
placement of paper documents with personally held digital
documentation in an urban area of Kenya. A simplified version
of the Kenyan birth registration process can be considered to
have the following steps:
1) The midwife present at the birth populates a Birth No-
tification Document (BND). As part of this process, the
mother of the child presents their iden- tity documents.
The mother’s name, and identity number, along with
other details of the birth are entered into the BND, which
is given to the baby’s mother for safe-keeping. A copy
for the registration form is sent to the District Registrars
Office.
2) At a later date, the mother visits the District Registrars
Office. The Registrar checks the BND and the mother’s
identity documentation against the copy received in the
office, and if all is in order, starts the process for issuing
a birth certificate to the mother for her child.
Digital birth registration is a sought-after use case in the
areas of global health and development, humanitarian relief,
and digital identity. The ability to accurately model this use
case can allow stakeholders to gain a better understanding of
dependencies and facilitate a shared language for evaluating
digital birth registration systems that use verifiable credentials
and public key cryptography.
A. Strategic Dependency View
Entities from the case study description have been rendered
as iStar 2.0 components, using the piStar[8] web-based tool as
a means to capture information. In the first instance, the iStar
2.0 Strategic Dependency (SD) View (Figure 3) illustrates the
dependencies that exist between the different Actors in the
case study. In an SSI system, the Actors are the parties that
would request and issue credentials, and execute and respond
to credential proof requests. The SD Graph highlights the
Mother’s goal of Get Birth Certificate, which is reliant on
provision on the BND and the Mother’s ID to the Registrar.
In turn, the BND needs to have been provided to the Mother
by the Midwife, so that it can be presented later.
Fig. 3. A Strategic Dependency view of birth registration.
The SD View for the simplified birth registration process
provides a clear mapping to the elements in a self-sovereign
design for the system, where individual actors control their
own data and credentials, with proofs of credentials being
requested and provided as appropriate.
The mapping between actors in the SD graph and the roles
played in SSI systems is that the Midwife is a Verifier of the
Mother’s ID, as well as being the Issuer of the BND credential.
The direction of the Dependency markers on the diagram
illustrate which Resources need to be presented to each party,
or in self-sovereign terms, where a proof of credential would
need to be presented. It is not clear, however, whether a
Resource needs to be issued to an Actor, or if it needs to
be presented by the Actor. Figure 3 shows that the Mother
needs the BND to be issued to her by the Midwife, whereas
the Midwife needs the Mother to present proof of already
held credentials (i.e. proof of ID credentials issued by another
agency). Both are shown in the same way in the iStar 2.0 SD
diagram.
B. Strategic Rationale View
The iStar 2.0 Strategic Rationale (SR) View (Figure 4)
looks at the goals and tasks inside each Actor, and considers
what needs to be achieved in order to meet their goals and
any requests made of them by other actors in the ecosystem.
The defining goal of the case study can be seen inside the
Mother role, which is to “Get Birth Certificate for new baby”.
This goal depends on the Registrar’s goal of “Issue Birth
Cerificates”, which in turn requires the Registrar to check
both the Mother’s ID and the BND - the BND in turn,
needs to be provided to the Mother by the Midwife, whose
own goal is to “Issue Valid BNDs”. Looking inside of each
Actor beings to give insight into the logic of the processes
and the requirements and constraints in the system. The use
of terminology such as “Check” inside an Actor is a good
Fig. 4. A Strategic Rationale view of birth registration.
indicator that the Actor is a Verifier of a presented credential,
whereas ”Provide” can be used to give clarity that the Actor
will be presenting proof of a credential they hold, and “Issue”
that they are a party responsible for issuing a credential to
another Actor. As such, the mapping of the each actor’s roles
in the SSI system can be well understood from the Strategic
Rationale View. Additionally, the SR View provides scope for
the inclusion of policies and governance frameworks, which
are a crucial non-technical piece of the self-sovereign identity
model. Such frameworks describe the trust models for SSI
systems, determining relationships between credential issuing
parties, for example, such that Verifiers are able to judge which
credentials should be accepted and which not.
IV. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Modelling the birth registration use case with iStar 2.0
and framing a visual representation with the piStar tool has
provided an insightful graphical depiction of the Actors in
the case study, their goals, and the resources (as Credentials
and Proofs) that need to pass between them. Considering the
effectiveness of the iStar 2.0 model of the birth registration use
case, it is noted that the Strategic Dependency view doesn’t
clearly provide indication whether a party is responsible for
issuing a credential or for presenting a proof of a credential
that they already hold. At this early investigative stage, this
would appear to be a shortcoming in the modelling that would
have an impact in describing how an implementation of the
system would be developed.
It is possible that modifications to the primitives used either
for the representation of Actors, or for the interface between
the Resource dependency and the Actor to show that the
Actor needs to issue a credential for this Resource would
address this, or that further experience modelling with the
iStar 2.0 language or related frameworks might lead to a
solution and recommendation based on the existing language.
When looking deeper into the modelling, via the Strategic
Rationale view, the use of language such as “Issue”, “Provide”
and “Check” is able to clearly and simply describe whether
the action is one of credential issuance, proof presentation or
verification.
In order to evaluate further, the iStar 2.0 framework will
be applied to additional use cases, including those specific
to the COVID-19 pandemic, to enable broader insight of its
applicability for modelling SSI systems. Modelling of the
same systems using other goal-oriented frameworks will also
take place, such that comparisons can be drawn in order to
determine the most effective approach for future analysis. A
longer-term and important goal of research into modelling SSI
systems is to identify or develop an approach to converting
models into software agents, such that they can be rendered
and used in a simulation environment, with the intent of
allowing system behaviours to be experienced and refined, and
interactions to be tested prior to development and deployment.
As such, it will be extremely desirable if the tools used to
model the systems are able to output code that is able to seed
simulations with the appropriate actor and message interfaces.
This, in turn, might kindle additional progress toward practical
SSI applications.
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